Een zeldzaam mooie en oprechte inkijk in het dagelijks leven en de cultuur van de favela's in Rio. De andere kant van de vermeend vreedzame pacificatie door de politie in de cidade maravilhosa.
vrijdag 6 juni 2014
zaterdag 31 mei 2014
Terreuraanslag in Rio
Afgelopen zaterdag vond in Rio de Janeiro een aanslag plaats op een metrotrein. Binnen drie minuten waren de eerste hulptroepen ter plaatse om de slachtoffers te kunnen helpen. Dertien minuten later gevolgd door metropersoneel om de gewonden naar aard van kwetsuur van elkaar te scheiden en brandweerlieden die het gebied wisten af te grenzen van de buitenwereld. Twee minuten daarop arriveerden de politiemensen van de Dienst Chemische, Radiologische, Biologische en Nucleaire Bescherming.
Het aantal slachtoffers doet er niet toe om het simpele feit dat er geen daadwerkelijke aanslag had plaatsgevonden. Het betrof een oefening van de deelstaat Rio de Janeiro in het kader van een mogelijke terreuraanslag tijdens het aanstaande wereldkampioenschap voetbal dat in Brazilië zal gaan plaatsvinden. De actie stond dan ook onder leiding van het Coördinatiecentrum voor Gebiedsbescherming van de deelstaat.
Een dergelijke aanslag wordt vooralsnog niet echt verwacht, maar in de hedendaagse wereld weet men het maar nooit. Brazilië zelf heeft geen verleden met dergelijke (islamitisch-geïnspireerde) terreuraanslagen en in haar buitenlandse politiek staat het land niet bekend als een trouwe bondgenoot aan de zijde van de Verenigde Staten. In het recente verleden hebben de Brazilianen een neutrale rol voor zichzelf weggelegd als het gaat om de politieke gebeurtenissen in Iran, Libië en Syrië.
Het land kent een aanzienlijke islamitische minderheid in het zuiden, om precies te zijn in de deelstaten Paraná en São Paulo. Deze Arabische gemeenschap leeft daar al decennialang en heeft nooit voor grote problemen gezorgd. Wel werd de grote Arabische gemeenschap in Foz de Iguaçu, in het grensgebied met Argentinië en Paraguay, wegens vermeende aanhang voor de Libanese Hezbollah-beweging, in verband gebracht met een bomaanslag op 18 juli 1994op de joodse Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina in de Argentijnse hoofdstad Buenos Aires. Maar harde bewijzen zijn daarvoor nooit gevonden.
De meest reële terreurdreiging tegen het WK Voetbal tot nu toe is afkomstig van de grootste drugsbende van de stad São Paulo, de PCC (Primeiro Comanda da Capital). Vorig najaar verklaarde de leider van deze bende dat zij tijdens het voetbaltoernooi bereid zou zijn tot het plegen van aanslagen op metrostations als niet op hun eisen werd ingegaan: het verhinderen van de overplaatsing van hooggeplaatste bendeleden naar maximaal beveiligde gevangenissen in het binnen land van de deelstaat. Werkelijk serieus werd de dreiging door Braziliaanse wetenschappers niet genomen. Er wordt niet aan getwijfeld dat de PCC er de capaciteit voor heeft, maar een dergelijke bloederige aanslag op toeristen en gewone Brazilianen zou volgens kenners tot geen enkel voordeel voor de drugsbendes leiden. Er is sindsdien dan ook niets meer van vernomen.

De actie hebben er voor de coördinatie naar eigen zeggen geen problemen opgeleverd en zou vlekkeloos zijn verlopen. De Brazilianen en de buitenlandse gasten kunnen rustig gaan slapen. Als er een dergelijke aanslag zou plaatsvinden dan zal alles voorspoedig en veilig worden afgehandeld, aldus kort samengevat de bevindingen van de leiding van de Dienst Chemische, Radiologische, Biologische en Nucleaire Bescherming van de deelstaat Rio de Janeiro.
Een dergelijke aanslag wordt vooralsnog niet echt verwacht, maar in de hedendaagse wereld weet men het maar nooit. Brazilië zelf heeft geen verleden met dergelijke (islamitisch-geïnspireerde) terreuraanslagen en in haar buitenlandse politiek staat het land niet bekend als een trouwe bondgenoot aan de zijde van de Verenigde Staten. In het recente verleden hebben de Brazilianen een neutrale rol voor zichzelf weggelegd als het gaat om de politieke gebeurtenissen in Iran, Libië en Syrië.
Het land kent een aanzienlijke islamitische minderheid in het zuiden, om precies te zijn in de deelstaten Paraná en São Paulo. Deze Arabische gemeenschap leeft daar al decennialang en heeft nooit voor grote problemen gezorgd. Wel werd de grote Arabische gemeenschap in Foz de Iguaçu, in het grensgebied met Argentinië en Paraguay, wegens vermeende aanhang voor de Libanese Hezbollah-beweging, in verband gebracht met een bomaanslag op 18 juli 1994op de joodse Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina in de Argentijnse hoofdstad Buenos Aires. Maar harde bewijzen zijn daarvoor nooit gevonden.
De meest reële terreurdreiging tegen het WK Voetbal tot nu toe is afkomstig van de grootste drugsbende van de stad São Paulo, de PCC (Primeiro Comanda da Capital). Vorig najaar verklaarde de leider van deze bende dat zij tijdens het voetbaltoernooi bereid zou zijn tot het plegen van aanslagen op metrostations als niet op hun eisen werd ingegaan: het verhinderen van de overplaatsing van hooggeplaatste bendeleden naar maximaal beveiligde gevangenissen in het binnen land van de deelstaat. Werkelijk serieus werd de dreiging door Braziliaanse wetenschappers niet genomen. Er wordt niet aan getwijfeld dat de PCC er de capaciteit voor heeft, maar een dergelijke bloederige aanslag op toeristen en gewone Brazilianen zou volgens kenners tot geen enkel voordeel voor de drugsbendes leiden. Er is sindsdien dan ook niets meer van vernomen.

De actie hebben er voor de coördinatie naar eigen zeggen geen problemen opgeleverd en zou vlekkeloos zijn verlopen. De Brazilianen en de buitenlandse gasten kunnen rustig gaan slapen. Als er een dergelijke aanslag zou plaatsvinden dan zal alles voorspoedig en veilig worden afgehandeld, aldus kort samengevat de bevindingen van de leiding van de Dienst Chemische, Radiologische, Biologische en Nucleaire Bescherming van de deelstaat Rio de Janeiro.
woensdag 28 mei 2014
Wall Street Journal, Hope Fades in Brazil for a World Cup Economic Boost
Prima en gedegen artikel in de Wall Street Journal over de maatschappelijke onvrede en eventuele politieke gevolgen in de aanloop naar het WK Voetbal in Brazilië.
Some long-term infrastructure projects, such as the Fortaleza light-rail, have been canceled amid budget overruns for stadiums.
Reuters
Hope Fades in Brazil for a World Cup Economic Boost
Amid
Unfinished or Canceled Infrastructure Projects, Hopes Wane That Soccer
Tournament Spending Could Spur Long-Term Growth
By
John Lyons and
Loretta Chao
May 27, 2014 10:30 p.m. ET
A growing number of Brazilians are against
hosting the World Cup, which they say has done little to improve infrastructure
and public services. Photo: Getty Images
RIO DE JANEIRO—Not too long
ago, Tarcísio Monteiro was so obsessed with World Cup soccer he bought a
plastic World Cup trophy for his room in a cramped Rio de Janeiro slum.
Now that Brazil is hosting the
event, he has become so angry about the money being spent that he joined mass protests
against it. He bought goggles for the tear gas and hung them near his trophy.
"Look how many billions
were spent on the Cup and how much got down to us," said the 38-year-old
hotel worker, who lives in Rio's Santo Amaro slum, a labyrinth of narrow alleys
not far from Maracanã stadium, where the Cup final will be played.
Mr. Monteiro's shift from
World Cup fanatic to protester highlights a wave of disillusionment that has
swept Brazil ahead of the event, which begins June 12. Such bitterness was once
unimaginable. Passion for World Cup soccer runs so deep in Brazil—the winner of
more Cups than any other nation—that people here say they live in a
"country of soccer." Still, just 48% of Brazilians now say hosting it
was a good idea, down from 79% in 2008, according to an April 8 poll by
Brazil's Datafolha, the most recent.
The explanation goes beyond
sports. For many Brazilians, the Cup has become a symbol of the unfulfilled
promise of an economic boom for this South American nation. But the boom has
fizzled. And now the World Cup's $11.5 billion price tag—the most expensive
ever—and a list of unfinished construction projects have become reminders of
the shortcomings that many believe keep Brazil poor: overwhelming bureaucracy,
corruption and shortsighted policy-making that prioritizes grand projects over
needs like education and health care.
"It's an affront, in a
country with so many deficiencies in basic needs, to organize a Cup in this
way," said Alcyr Leme, a São Paulo investment manager and lifelong soccer
fan. Mr. Leme has fond memories of going to see Brazilian legend Pelé play in
the 1960s. But he plans to watch this Cup at home. Buying game tickets would
only condone the waste, he said.
Across Brazil, $3.6 billion in
taxpayer money has been poured into stadiums, as much as the stadium bill for
the past two Cups combined, and builders are still racing to finish. Meantime,
work on airports, roads and other long term projects promised to benefit
development in Brazil became hampered by bureaucratic squabbles, allegations of
corruption and other obstacles. With days to go, the stadiums
are mostly built, but the areas around them often resemble construction sites. (See a guide to Brazil's
World Cup stadiums.)
In Natal, where the U.S. plays
its first game, workers are hiding unfinished access ramps to the local stadium
with coverings depicting beach scenes as a last-ditch cosmetic fix. The small
northeastern city's politics became embroiled in debates over alleged
contracting irregularities as it fell behind on promised roads and other structures.
In Fortaleza, another poor
northeastern city hosting six games, builders finished the Castelão stadium for
$230 million. But fans arriving at Fortaleza's airport will find a giant tent
rather than a new planned terminal. Federal prosecutors are looking into
whether corruption played a role in the failure of the $78 million terminal
expansion project. Not far away, a planned light-rail to alleviate traffic is
an unfinished stretch of rubble. It hit financial trouble and disputes over
land ownership.
Griping over costs is expected
these days in any country hosting a big sports event like the World Cup or the
Olympic Games—which Brazil also hosts in 2016. But in Brazil, the Cup has
become a catchall for a development conundrum that has long bedeviled it: How
is it that a country with vast natural resources, such as iron ore, farmland
and oil, remains poor?
Tarcísio Monteiro protested in February over
World Cup spending. Kim Badawi for The Wall Street Journal
"The country of soccer is
reacting to the waste, the unfinished infrastructure projects, the allegations
of corruption, the poor quality of schools and hospitals, the poor use of
resources," said Mailson da Nóbrega, a former Finance Minister of Brazil
who now runs the Tendências economic think tank in São Paulo.
As visitors to the Cup will
find out, Brazilians are upset at their leaders' organization of the Cup, but
not their national team, called the Seleção, or the tournament itself, which
are revered with almost religious sanctity in Brazil. Once the tournament
begins, many businesses and schools are expected to close as the country
becomes engrossed in noisy Seleção fervor.
But public dismay over
perceived waste runs so deep that this is the first World Cup where major
protests are a concern. In June 2013, a million Brazilians marched during a
World Cup warm-up tournament to decry issues they said should take priority
over stadiums, such as poor public transportation, and failing schools and
hospitals. Outside games, police fired tear-gas at protesters holding banners
saying "We Want FIFA Standard Schools," a play on the stadium
standards required by soccer's organizing body.
Support for the big marches
dwindled after some became violent and a television cameraman died covering
one. All the same, Brazil is deploying a 157,000-person security force to
contain smaller groups still vowing to disrupt the Cup. On Tuesday, protesters
in Brasília disrupted an exhibition of the Cup trophy.
Harder to muzzle are critics,
which even include Brazilian soccer stars who became disillusioned after acting
as official Cup ambassadors, such as Ronaldo, a two-time Cup winner and its
all-time leading scorer, and Romário, a star on the Brazil team that won the
1994 Cup. Now a congressman, Romário has publicly called it "the biggest
heist in the history of Brazil."
It has become a political
headache for Brazil's left-wing President Dilma Rousseff, who is seeking a
second term in October elections. Analysts once predicted the monthlong Cup
would launch a re-election campaign portraying her as an efficient leader.
Instead, Ms. Rousseff will play a low-key role and has decided not to speak at
the opener.
Ms. Rousseff has launched a
drive to defend preparations for the Cup that includes TV ads. "The legacy
of the Cup is ours. No one who comes here will leave with an airport, urban
mobility projects, or stadiums, in their luggage," Ms. Rousseff told hotel
and tourism workers in Brasília on May 15.
The government argues projects
such as airports will eventually be finished and provide long-term benefits.
Brazil estimates the Cup will generate some 380,000 jobs and attract 600,000
foreign tourists. The event is forecast to inject some $11.1 billion in
advertising, airlines, hotels and other spending in the economy. But the jobs
are largely temporary and, Moody's Investors Service predicts, the impact on
Brazil's $2.2 trillion economy will be small.
Ms. Rousseff has had to
compete with the dour assessments of senior FIFA official Jerome Valke, who
publicly called working with Brazil's bureaucracy "hell" and admitted
that "maybe there will be things that are not totally ready at the
beginning of the World Cup."
In 2007, when Brazil was named
host of this year's Cup, then President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva presented it
as a coming-out party for an emerging nation finally becoming prosperous. After
decades of crashes, Brazil had a growing economy based on a steady currency. A
new consumer class was rising among Brazil's poor. And with commodity prices
rising, Brazil made some of the world's biggest oil finds off Rio de Janeiro.
Brazil's stock market surged 44% in 2007. Rio was also awarded the Olympics two years later.
But Brazil's rise stalled.
After notching 7.5% growth in 2010, the economy is now in its fourth year of a
slump, partly sapped by the steep fall in commodity prices. The new consumer
class ran out of steam after racking
up big credit-card debts. Manufacturing fell into recession as high taxes and
crumbling infrastructure stifled competitiveness. The big oil discoveries
haven't borne fruit: Oil production has stagnated amid corruption and
mismanagement scandals. In one, police are investigating why the state oil
company Petrobras paid $1.2 billion for a Texas refinery valued earlier at $45
million. The company denied wrongdoing and defended the amount paid.
Public services like health
care remain in dire shape even though a 2007 promotional video for the Cup
promised "new hospitals" by now. Not far from the Fortaleza stadium, Ivanildo
Lopes said he has been waiting a year to get a painful 1-inch kidney stone
removed. That is common, says Florentino Cardoso, president of the Brazilian
Medical Association.
In Brazil, the child mortality
rate is twice that of the U.S., and access to doctors is so limited the country
began importing them from Cuba in 2013. Government investment in health care
has remained flat as a percentage of GDP in recent years, according to the
medical association. A Health Ministry spokeswoman said its budget increases
each year and declined to comment on long waits.
Initially, Brazil's government
said it would find private funding for the stadiums, and set aside taxpayer
funds for projects that would provide a long-term boost to the economy. The
most important of these would be improved public transportation in a country
where some big cities have no subway and workers take multihour rides on muggy
buses.
In the end, stadiums were
built almost exclusively with taxpayer money as their costs quadrupled and
private lenders questioned stadiums' future profitability.
Take the Cup's opening game, to be held in a brand-new 62,000-seat stadium that will be owned by São Paulo's Corinthians soccer team after the Cup. The $550 million stadium was financed with government loans and $200 million in local tax breaks, because the heavily indebted Corinthians couldn't find private lenders.
Meantime, few major
transportation projects were completed. The signature project was to be a $16
billion bullet train between Rio and São Paulo. Latin America's first
high-speed bullet train would be running by the World Cup and be complete by
the Olympics, a then-cabinet chief Ms.
Rousseff said in 2009. The project was to be the foundation of a new state
train company that could spread fast trains throughout Brazil.
Brazil put the São Paulo-Rio
rail project out to bid in 2010, and then-President da Silva used the bidding
ceremony to rebut critics of Brazil's preparations. "They are already
pressuring us: Where are the airports? Where is the subway? As though we were a
bunch of idiots who don't know how to do things," Mr. da Silva said.
But that 2010 bidding round
was canceled. Potential rail builders balked on concerns that government-set
limits on fare prices meant the train might not be profitable. Firms also
feared cost overruns since Brazil's legal system makes it easy for a single
lawsuit to shut down a project. Brazil tried and failed to come up with terms
that made sense. Bid rounds were announced and canceled three more times before
the government shelved the project in 2013.
Allegations of possible corruption
have also arisen. The cost to build a 69,000 seat stadium in the capital
Brasília rose 68% to $636 million—and could go higher once all the bills are
in, according to a 141-page report by a city auditor. The report found
"grave irregularities" were a key cause of the bloated budget, from
overbilling for transportation to a suspicious 12.1% loss rate on steel. No
charges have been filed. The builder of the stadium, Andrade Gutierrez SA,
declined to comment.
Brazil also tried to do too
much, critics say. The Cup is taking place in a dozen cities, even though FIFA
asked for only eight. The idea was to spread the benefits across the nation.
But smaller cities got overwhelmed. And four Cup cities don't have big soccer
teams, so their stadiums may be unused after the Cup—another reason private
lenders balked at chipping in to build them. The Amazon city Manaus got a
39,000 seat stadium, but its biggest local games barely draw 1,500 fans.
The city's plans for a
monorail, meanwhile, never got off the drawing board. Federal prosecutors found
so many budget irregularities that a judge shut the project down.
The 12-city Cup was a boon to
Brazilian construction companies such as Andrade Gutierrez and Odebrecht SA,
which built many of the stadiums. But even Odebrecht Chief Executive Marcelo
Odebrecht has said Brazil would have been better off with just eight host
cities. "The legacy of the World Cup on infrastructure was much less than
expected," Mr. Odebrecht said.
The Cup's best legacy may be
at its long decaying, military-run airports, experts say. To give them a
face-lift, Brazil decided to turn several over to private operators charged
with upgrades such as new terminals.
But the process was delayed by
years as government officials argued over how much control the new private
operators should get and for how long. As a result, the São Paulo and Brasília
airports were privatized only in February 2012. In São Paulo, the operator
managed to build a new terminal in just a year and a half. But with so little
lead time, there has been almost no noticeable improvement at São Paulo's dank
main terminal, which handles the bulk of international traffic.
Mr. Monteiro, the World Cup
fan-turned-protester, says he won't benefit much from the airport projects.
Born in the impoverished northeastern state of Bahia, Mr. Monteiro dropped out
of school at 13 to work and help his family. Today he is one of the 70 million
Brazilians over 25 who never finished high school.
As Brazil's economy grew, he
moved to Rio in search of a better life, and landed in a cramped room in a
rough Rio slum. He found a job as a pool boy at a major hotel and started going
to night school.
But Mr. Monteiro's education
stalled—his grammar school hadn't even prepared him for night school. Rio
beefed up security, but Mr. Monteiro's slum is still a dangerous place. Planned
transportation projects never reached him: he walks miles from his favela home
to work each way.
When Mr. Monteiro saw
demonstrators taking to the streets in cities across Brazil in June 2013, something
clicked. Brazil was supposedly on the rise, but his life was no better. He ran
out into the streets and found himself among youths wearing all black and
clashing with police. The violence he saw unnerved him but it also matched his
rage.
These days, he no longer
thinks violence works. But he has a child on the way and his optimism is gone.
"I worry about whether I can provide a good life for my son," he
said.
donderdag 22 mei 2014
woensdag 21 mei 2014
donderdag 8 mei 2014
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
PERSBERICHT
Donderdag 8 mei 2014
Brazilië: Een gele kaart voor het inperken van de vrijheid van demonstratie!
In de aanloop naar de Wereldkampioenschappen voetbal 2014 lanceert Amnesty International vandaag een wereldwijde campagne om te zorgen dat ook Braziliaanse veiligheidstroepen zich aan de regels van het spel gaan houden. Verwacht wordt dat voorafgaand aan en tijdens het WK meerdere demonstraties zullen plaatsvinden. Amnesty vreest dat de politie daar met buitensporig geweld op zal reageren, en dat de overheid tal van beperkingen van de vrijheid van meningsuiting zal doorvoeren .
Tijdens de campagne 'Geen vals spel, Brazilië!' vraagt Amnesty mensen gele kaarten te sturen naar de Braziliaanse president Dilma Rousseff en naar de voorzitter van het Congres, Renan Calheiros, Daarin roepen zij hen op het recht op vrije meningsuiting en vreedzame demonstratie tijdens het WK te respecteren.
Sinds juni vinden er in Brazilië grootschalige demonstraties plaats. Veel protesten worden veroorzaakt door de groeiende onvrede over de slechte staat van publieke voorzieningen in stedelijke gebieden. De politie reageert regelmatig met buitensporig en onnodig geweld, en zet vaak traangas en rubberkogels in tegen demonstranten.
'Protesteren is geen misdrijf, maar een mensenrecht. De regering heeft de verantwoordelijkheid om mensen te beschermen. In plaats daarvan gaan veiligheidstroepen demonstranten met geweld te lijf. Alle vormen van politiegeweld moeten worden onderzocht, en de verantwoordelijken moeten voor de rechter worden gebracht,' zei Atila Roque, directeur van Amnesty International in Brazilië.
'De Braziliaanse regering moet garanderen dat tijdens het WK de vrijheden van meningsuiting en vreedzame demonstratie voor iedereen worden gewaarborgd. De veiligheidstroepen moeten goed getraind worden en het gebruik van traangas en rubberen kogels moet goed gereguleerd worden.'
Nieuwe wetgeving
Brazilië zet ook wetgeving tegen vreedzame demonstranten in die is bedoeld voor het bestrijden van de georganiseerde misdaad en van milities die actief zijn in de steden. Er liggen op dit moment meerdere nieuwe, vaag geformuleerde wetsvoorstellen bij het Nationale Congres die de deelname aan vreedzame demonstraties zouden bestraffen. Deze wetgeving zou een nieuwe bedreiging van de vrijheid van meningsuiting vormen.
'Vreedzaam protest mag nooit als een bedreiging worden beschouwd. In plaats van demonstranten te criminaliseren zouden de autoriteiten een constructieve dialoog met hen moeten aangaan,' zei Atila Roque.
Met nog slechts enkele weken te gaan voor de start van het WK, dat zich op 12 plaatsen in Brazilië zal afspelen, nemen federale autoriteiten en deelstaatregeringen speciale maatregelen op het gebied van de openbare veiligheid en het optreden van de politie.
Amnesty wijst er op dat nieuwe en bestaande wetgeving aan internationale mensenrechten en standaarden moeten beantwoorden. Ook het handhaven van de openbare orde, waaronder het optreden van de politie moet plaatsvinden volgens internationale mensenrechtenstandaarden.
Brazilië kent een geschiedenis van buitensporig politiegeweld. Volgens officiële bronnen werden tussen 2002 en 2011 alleen al in Rio de Janeiro 10.000 door de politie gedood. Slechts een klein deel van deze incidenten met dodelijke afloop is goed onderzocht.
Amnesty opent tijdens de campagne een petitie voor ondertekening. De ingezamelde handtekeningen zullen op 5 juni aan de autoriteiten in Brasilia worden aangeboden. Amnesty werkt tijdens deze campagne samen met andere maatschappelijke organisaties in Brazilië die strijden voor het recht op vrijheid van meningsuiting en vreedzame demonstratie.
woensdag 9 april 2014
Amnesty International, The military occupation of Maré ahead of Brazil’s World Cup
The military occupation of Maré ahead of Brazil’s World Cup

Military forces have occupied Rio de Janeiro’s Maré complex of favelas (slums) ahead of the World Cup. © Marco Derksen
Early last Saturday morning (5 April 2014), the streets of Rio de Janeiro’s Maré complex of favelas (slums) woke up to a military occupation by around 2,700 federal Army troops. They took over from a military police contingent that had been in the area since 30 March.
Under an agreement with the authorities, the security forces will remain there until 31 July, after the World Cup ends. Once they leave, it’s expected that a Pacifying Police Unit (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, UPP) will set up in Maré.
The Maré complex is home to some 132,000 people, spread across 16 communities. It’s a collection of slums and informal settlements located between Rio de Janeiro’s main access routes, and lies close to the international airport. It’s a diverse community, with a history of community organization and poor access to public services. Its residents share the space with organized criminal groups and milícias – criminal gangs made up largely of former or off-duty state law-enforcement agents.
The relationship between the police and Maré residents has been marked by violence and abuse, the result of the “war” on crime and drug-trafficking in the community, which has affected young black residents in particular. The residents are apprehensive about the changes, despite the prospect of getting rid of the entrenched “authority” of drug trafficking and the expectation of having better access to public services.
For Amnesty International Brazil, the Army’s presence in Maré is both a difficult and an opportune moment for the state to demonstrate that public security is a right to be guaranteed to and enjoyed by all city residents, with no exceptions. The favelas and outlying areas shouldn’t be treated as “enemy territory” to be conquered, and the battle against criminal elements shouldn’t lead to the criminalization of the entire community – especially the youth.
As the World Cup approaches, there’s a growing fear that this model – intervention by the Army and other security forces in the favelas – could be expanded, raising the threat of human rights violations and the militarization of daily life in the poorest communities. The armed forces have inadequate training for this type of operation, as well as little experience of engaging in dialogue with civil society and communities.
It’s worth remembering that the latest interventions by federal forces and state public security agencies in Rio de Janeiro led to grave human rights violations. In June 2007, an operation carried out with the help of the National Force in the Alemão complex of favelas resulted in 19 residents being killed in clashes with security forces. Some of them bore evidence of extrajudicial and summary executions, according to an investigation by independent experts. In June 2008, soldiers engaged in a federal security project in Morro da Providência were responsible for the deaths of three young people, who were killed after the soldiers handed them over to a criminal group.
The ‘We’re from Maré and we have rights’ campaign

AI
Brazil and local NGOs visit the Maré favelas in Brazil to help to
educate the residents about their rights. © Redes de Desenvolvimento da
Maré
Amnesty International Brazil has been closely linked to the Maré communities since 2012, when we launched the campaign, “We’re from Maré and we have rights”, along with the local NGOs Redes de Desenvolvimiento da Maré and Observatório de Favelas. The campaign’s goal is to inform residents about their rights and prevent abuses and disrespectful actions by the security forces, especially when they deploy on the streets and in the houses of the favelas. Towards this aim, we and our partners have distributed educational materials directly to more than 35,000 homes in Maré, as a way of preparing the communities for the installation of the UPP in the area after the World Cup.
Last week, in a meeting with Rio de Janeiro State’s Secretary of Security, we presented the concerns and demands Maré’s residents have about the military occupation.
Directors of NGOs working in Maré unanimously demanded that the state recognize local mechanisms for controlling and mediating conflict, such as a community ombudsperson. This would be one way to ensure that the organized criminal groups’ use of violence to exert their control over the community isn’t just substituted by police doing the same thing. Another thing the organizations want is for the state to make inroads into Maré, not only through the police, but also through a range of essential services and a guarantee of rights for all.
Amnesty International Brazil will keep acting with our local partners in Maré and other human rights NGOs to ensure that the state security forces’ entry into the complex of favelas becomes a milestone for guaranteeing human rights, and not just the beginning of another violent chapter in the communities’ history.
Read more:
Brazil: Slum campaign on human rights ahead of police operation (News story, 5 November 2012)
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